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First published January 8, 2014; doi:10.1152/jn.00323.2013.—Recently, the
functional specialization of prefrontal areas of the brain, and, specif-
ically, the functional dissociation of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), during decision making have
become a particular focus of research. A number of neuropsycholog-
ical and lesion studies have shown that the OFC and ACC have
dissociable functions in various dimensions of decision making,
which are supported by their different anatomical connections. A
recent single-neuron study, however, described a more complex
picture of the functional dissociation between these two frontal
regions during decision making. Here, I discuss the results of that
study and consider alternative interpretations in connection with other
ﬁndings.
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THE GOAL OF COST-BENEFIT COMPUTATIONS is to maximize the
economic value of a choice, a process often referred to as
utility maximization by economists. Using external (e.g., en-
vironmental cues) and internal (e.g., memory of past experi-
ences) input, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) supports adaptive
behavior in decision making by considering a multitude of
decision variables, including costs, quality, quantity, the sub-
jective desirability of the expected outcome at the time of
decision, and the appropriateness of the outcome based on the
current needs and goals. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are the two primary frontal
areas that have been implicated in reinforcement-guided deci-
sion making in a dynamic environment under varying circum-
stances. The OFC encodes the expected value of decisions and
makes this information available for other PFC areas to use in
planning and adopting strategies, whereas the ACC encodes
action values and monitors the outcomes of actions. Whenever
an outcome suggests a change in the value of a choice, the OFC
and ACC signal that a decision needs be revised based on the
changed circumstances. Reversal learning is a special example
of this process.
Interest has recently been growing in the functional special-
ization of distinct frontal regions in different aspects of deci-
sion making. The OFC and ACC display dissociable functions
in several dimensions of decision making (Lee et al. 2007;
Rushworth et al. 2007). The differing anatomical connections
of the OFC and ACC with high-level sensory and motor
systems have prompted the suggestion that the OFC and ACC
make distinct contributions to decision making by representing
sensory stimulus reinforcement and action reinforcement, re-
spectively (Rushworth et al. 2007). A number of studies have
demonstrated such a dissociation in human patients with focal
frontal damage (Camille et al. 2011) and in monkeys with
circumscribed lesions in either the OFC or the ACC (Rudebeck
et al. 2008). These lesion studies showed that the OFC and
ACC are essential for optimal decision making that depends on
stimulus-outcome (SO) and action-outcome (AO) associations,
respectively. However, it is not yet clear how underlying neural
activity supports such a regional specialization in function. In
addition, lesion studies may be unable to further characterize
subregional functional specializations of the PFC. Luk and
Wallis (2013) recently investigated whether a dissociation
between the OFC and ACC in encoding SO and AO associa-
tions holds at the level of single neurons.
Luk and Wallis (2013) designed two analogous decision-
making tasks that required either SO or AO associations and
simultaneously recorded neural activity in both the OFC and
ACC in monkeys. They placed a particular emphasis on sep-
arating the cuing of possible decision options from the animal’s
response. The tasks consisted of two distinct phases: a predic-
tive sampling phase in which the subject either was presented
with two sequential pictures (SO) or performed two sequential
actions (AO), with each event predicting a speciﬁc juice
reward; and a choice phase in which the animal had to choose
between a leftward or a rightward lever movement on the basis
of the outcomes that were associated with the two events in the
sampling phase (Fig. 1). In the SO task, two pictures that had
been presented sequentially in the sampling phase were pre-
sented side by side in the choice phase, and the monkey had to
choose the lever movement that would lead to the preferred
outcome. The use of this two-phase task design and simulta-
neous recording from both frontal regions enabled the authors
to separate the underlying neural activity associated with prep-
aration for decision making from that associated with the
decision itself and to analyze corresponding neural activity in
both regions under the same circumstances. Such a design
avoids complications in interpretation that arise when compar-
ing the results of single-neuron studies conducted during sep-
arate experiments or in different laboratories that use different
tasks.
To study the encoding of AO and SO associations, Luk and
Wallis (2013) examined neural activity starting from the onset
of the ﬁrst reward and continuing until the end of the ﬁrst delay
(Fig. 1). They found weak support for dissociated encoding of
SO and AO associations in the OFC and ACC, respectively. In
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Fig. 1. The sequence of steps for a trial in action-outcome (AO) and stimulus-outcome (SO) tasks. Every trial was composed of two phases: a sampling phase
in which the monkey became familiar with two different outcomes (juices) associated with two different actions (AO task) or two different stimuli (SO task),
and a choice phase in which the animal had the chance to choose a larger amount of one juice from two sampled juices. As shown, the volume of the ﬁnal choice
juice (0.77 ml delivered during 1.25 s) was almost three times greater than that of the sampling juice (0.25 ml delivered during 0.4 s). In the sampling phase,
the juice was delivered so that its offset coincided with the offset of stimulus presentation (SO task) or immediately after the detection of lever movement by
the monkey (AO task). During the choice phase in both tasks, the monkey had to demonstrate his choice by a lever movement. For the SO task, the monkey
moved the lever toward the stimulus that was associated with the preferred reward in that trial.
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both regions, only a small proportion of neurons encoded
predictor  outcome interactions. This proportion was signif-
icantly above chance in the OFC during the SO task and in the
ACC during the AO task. A comparison between the areas
showed no signiﬁcant difference in distinct tasks between the
two brain regions; moreover, an examination of Table 1 in the
Luk and Wallis paper shows no signiﬁcant difference in task
selectivity for each area.
Luk and Wallis (2013) also examined neural activity during
the choice phase, which comprised the time between the onset
of the second reward delivery and the chosen action (i.e., the
median of the subject’s reaction times for each task in each
session). They showed that a signiﬁcant number of neurons
encoded the chosen action during this period. Statistical tests
on the neuronal populations that solely encoded the chosen
action with no signiﬁcant interaction with the stimulus or
outcome revealed a double dissociation in the prevalence of
action-selective (the action necessary to make a choice; i.e.,
choice-selective) neurons in the two brain areas. Choice-selec-
tive neurons were signiﬁcantly more prevalent in the ACC than
in the OFC in the AO task, whereas choice-selective neurons
were signiﬁcantly more prevalent in the OFC than in the ACC
in the SO task. This strong encoding of the choice with a clear
regional dissociation contrasts with the rather weaker encoding
of the SO and AO associations and highlights the importance
of a robust representation of the action that is necessary to
achieve the subject’s ﬁnal goal, the choice outcome. The
animals performing the tasks in this study used a clear prefer-
ence between the rewards as a basis for decision making.
Whether neuronal populations in the OFC and ACC would
encode the choice in such a robust manner in tasks that require
decisions to be made under more uncertain conditions (e.g., in
probabilistic settings) should be investigated in future studies.
Finally, the authors found that over one-half of the neurons in
both the OFC and ACC encoded the experienced reward, and
this ﬁnding could be used by the PFC to update values and to
guide future decisions. The experienced reward was encoded
primarily in a task-speciﬁc but not area-speciﬁc manner. In all
their analyses, Luk and Wallis (2013) used a sliding window to
compare the neural activity that represented different parame-
ters and the interactions among them. This method is useful for
comparing neuronal populations with different baseline activ-
ities and with a dynamic range of ﬁring rates because it allows
researchers to measure neuronal selectivity independently of
the absolute ﬁring rate (Kennerley et al. 2011). An additional
complementary set of analyses using a modiﬁed principal
component analysis method could prove useful for determining
the contribution of each parameter to the variability of the
observed neuronal activity (Machens 2010).
The ﬁndings of Luk and Wallis (2013) add to the current
debate regarding the distinct contribution of the different fron-
tal lobe regions in decision making. In particular, their ﬁndings
shed further light on the results of an earlier lesion study in
monkeys by Rudebeck et al. (2008). These two studies used
similar tasks but with some notable differences. Rudebeck et
al. (2008) used stochastic reward contingencies in which de-
cision making and learning were mixed. By contrast, Luk and
Wallis used a two-phase task design that required active
updating of value in every trial. To make the two tasks (AO
and SO tasks) as similar as possible in all parameters except the
association, Luk and Wallis required their subjects to perform
the same actions to demonstrate their choice in both tasks. The
earlier work by Rudebeck et al. found that the ACC but not the
OFC is critical for decisions that are based on AO associations
and that the OFC but not the ACC is critical for decisions that
are based on SO associations. At ﬁrst glance, the demonstration
by Luk and Wallis of a weak dissociation in the encoding of
SO and AO associations provides little support for the exis-
tence of a dissociation between the OFC and ACC in using SO
and AO associations to guide behavior, as shown by Rudebeck
et al. However, at least two explanations can relieve the
apparent disparity between the two studies. First, the “relative
dissociation” of encoding associations in two brain regions that
was shown by Luk and Wallis explains the moderate but
signiﬁcant impairment in decision-making tasks without com-
plete disruption in performance that was shown by Rudebeck
and colleagues. Second, an alternative interpretation of the
results of the lesion study by Rudebeck et al. is that the
task-speciﬁc impairment in decision making is largely due to
the context-speciﬁc impairment in choice coding, or “making a
choice,” rather than an impairment in encoding the SO and AO
associations. The greater prevalence of neurons encoding the
action demonstrating the animal’s choice and the dissociation
between the areas for the two tasks presented in the Luk and
Wallis (2013) study provide strong support for this alternative
interpretation.
The speciﬁc task design or the speciﬁc window of time in the
task chosen for the analyses of the SO and AO associations and
the manner in which the authors included the stimulus param-
eter in their analyses might explain why Luk and Wallis (2013)
did not observe a large number of neurons encoding associa-
tions. The authors analyzed neuronal responses during the ﬁrst
part of the sampling phase, that is, from the onset of the ﬁrst
reward delivery until the end of the ﬁrst delay. However,
associations are learned during the sampling phase and are
probably stored more robustly in other frontal regions (e.g., the
dorsolateral PFC), as the authors suggested. Therefore, it
would be more appropriate to look for representations of the
SO and AO associations during the choice phase rather than
during the sampling phase. Although this would be difﬁcult for
the AO task in the current task design, it would be possible for
the SO task. In fact, there is relatively strong encoding of
stimulus-choice (stimulus-response) and stimulus-choice-out-
come associations during the choice phase in both the OFC and
ACC (Luk and Wallis 2013, their Table 2). The strong stimu-
lus-response coding in both the OFC and ACC in the markedly
dynamic task employed by these authors can be partially
guided by SO association coding.
The manner in which Luk and Wallis (2013) included the
stimulus parameter in their analyses is a possible reason for the
lack of signiﬁcant encoding of the SO association in the choice
phase (as shown in their Table 2). The authors used the spatial
position of the pictures as a stimulus parameter rather than the
identity of the chosen stimulus, while the performance of the
task enabled the monkeys to learn to associate the pictures with
the rewards during the sampling phase. Therefore, in addition
to the current analyses used by the authors, an alternative
analysis taking into account the chosen stimulus would be very
informative. Assume stimulus no. 1 and stimulus no. 2 are
presented side by side in the choice phase of the task. Two
conﬁgurations are possible if, like the authors, we include the
spatial position of the stimuli as a factor. In the ﬁrst conﬁgu-
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ration, stimulus no. 1 would be on the left and stimulus no. 2
would be on the right, and in the second conﬁguration, the
positions would be reversed. An interaction analysis between
these two conﬁgurations as stimulus factor and the choice
(leftward or rightward movement), which also has a spatial
component, would ensure that an exact stimulus is considered
for every trial. A left or right stimulus position combined with
a left or right action would specify which of the two stimuli is
chosen. For example, a leftward choice in the ﬁrst conﬁgura-
tion would mean stimulus no. 1 is chosen. In contrast, an
interaction analysis between these two conﬁgurations as stim-
ulus factor and a parameter with a nonspatial nature such as the
outcome would not clearly deﬁne the chosen stimulus. For
example, stimulus no. 1, which was associated with apple juice
(the outcome) in a given trial, could be presented in either
conﬁguration (left or right), but the interaction between the
outcome and spatial position of the stimulus would not repre-
sent the chosen stimulus in the analysis of the SO association.
However, the association between the outcome and the stim-
ulus was learned regardless of the next stimulus position in the
choice phase. This manner of including the stimulus parameter
in the analyses might explain the discrepancy between the
strong coding of interactions when the identity of the chosen
stimulus was deﬁned by the presence of another spatial param-
eter (i.e., S  A and S  A  O) and the lack of a signiﬁcant
S  O interaction in the analyses used by Luk and Wallis
(2013, their Table 2). Thus, the new analysis suggested here, in
which the stimulus identity (stimulus no. 1 or 2) is used as
stimulus factor in the S  O interaction analysis, may reveal a
signiﬁcant S  O interaction, thus underscoring the role of
encoding of the SO association “during decision making.” It
would also be interesting to plot the time course along which
the S  O interaction is encoded, in a similar way to how the
authors plotted the time course along which the chosen re-
sponse was encoded (Luk and Wallis 2013, their Fig. 6) and to
determine whether encoding of the SO interaction precedes
that of the chosen response.
In summary, the ﬁndings of Luk and Wallis (2013) provide
insight into the roles of single neurons during the different
phases of decision making and have the potential to stimulate
new studies for better understanding of the speciﬁc contribu-
tions of the OFC and ACC in decision making at the level of
single cells. Variations in the authors’ novel task design (e.g.,
replacing the spatial left/right action with one having less
spatial polarity in the SO task or integrating the task with
probabilistic settings) would offer new experiments that may
afford better understanding of prefrontal function in decision
making. An important property of prefrontal neurons is func-
tional reconﬁguration (Duncan 2001). The different functions
and roles of frontal areas in decision making cannot be encom-
passed in a single paradigm, and different paradigms, including
variations of the task design used by Luk and Wallis, should be
employed to address how underlying neural coding in varying
circumstances enables adaptive decision making.
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